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ABSTRACT
There is currently a conflict between laws and the market in
their treatment of email. Laws mandate that emails are not
protected as property unless copyrightable or protected by
another legal mechanism. But the market suggests that emails are
user-owned property without further qualification. Moreover, the
nature of email is treated slightly differently between the U.S. and
U.K. legal regimes. While the current legal regimes applicable to
email in the U.K. and U.S. are reasonable, legal harmonization
within these systems, and with the service provider market, should
be achieved.

INTRODUCTION
Email is widely known as an electronic system for exchange of
messages over the Internet. However, “email” commonly refers to
individual electronic messages, and usually only to the text of the
messages and their attachments.1 Email “accounts,” on the other hand, can
be analogized to the paper on which letters are written.2 Along this line,
accounts may be explained as some form of “physical” representation of
email, enabling and regulating access to the content, just as papers are
physical representation of letters and define access to their content.
According to the terms of service of Google, the leading email
service provider, the content that users “upload, submit, store, send or
receive” is owned by the users.3 Most service providers, however, claim a
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See DEREK HANSEN ET.AL., ANALYZING SOCIAL MEDIA NETWORKS WITH
NODEXL: INSIGHTS FROM A CONNECTED WORLD 106 (2010); Jianqiang Shen et
al., A Comparison Study of User Behavior on Facebook and Gmail, 29
COMPUTERS IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR 2650, 2650–55 (2013).
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Jason Mazzone, Facebook’s Afterlife, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1643, 1651 (2012)
(referring to Grigsby v. Breckenridge, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 480 (1867)).
3
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of
Service,
GOOGLE
(Apr.
14,
2014),
http://www.google.com/intl/en-GB/policies/terms/. See also Yahoo Terms of
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worldwide, royalty free and non-exclusive license to use and perform other
actions with that content.4 There are some minor differences, however.
When it comes to ownership, Google refers to all user content whereas
Microsoft refers only to some user content.5 As for terms of service,
Google’s and Microsoft’s terms apply to all content, whereas Yahoo’s
terms apply only to “photos, graphics, audio or video.”6 For all other
content that users “submit or make available for inclusion on publicly
accessible areas of the Yahoo Services,”7 Yahoo retains “[a] worldwide,
royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual, irrevocable, and fully sublicensable license.”8 Emails do not seem to belong to any of those
categories. Thus, the general provision allowing users to retain ownership
appears to apply to email content.
But does U.S. and U.K. law agree that users own this email
content as property? To answer this question, this note will focus on the
legal nature of emails and accounts, represented by their content.9 First, it
will focus on the state of the law with respect to copyright issues, which
spans users’ rights to control the original content of emails they create.
Then, it will focus on the state of the law with respect to users owning
information, personal data, and related data contained in their emails as

Service, YAHOO! (Jan. 20, 2014), https://info.yahoo.com/legal/eu/yahoo/utos/engb/.
4
Id.
5
Microsoft Services Agreement, MICROSOFT (June 4, 2015),
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-gb/windows-live/microsoft-servicesagreement (“[Y]our communications with others; postings or feedback submitted
by you to Microsoft via the Services; and the files, photos, documents, audio,
digital works, and videos that you upload, store or share through the Services.”).
6
Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO! ¶ 9.2 (Jan. 20, 2014),
https://info.yahoo.com/legal/eu/yahoo/utos/en-gb/.
7
Id. ¶ 9.4
8
Id.
9
Edwards and Harbinja define digital assets “widely and not exclusively to
include a huge range of intangible information goods associated with the online
or digital world”, giving examples of different digital assets. Lillian Edwards &
Edina Harbinja, What Happens to My Facebook Profile When I Die? Legal Issues
Around Transmission of Digital Assets on Death, in DIGITAL LEGACY AND
INTERACTION: POST-MORTEM ISSUES 115, 115–44 (Cristiano Maciel & Vinicius
Carvalho Pereira eds., 2013). For other definitions see Naomi Cahn, Postmortem
Life On-Line, 25 PROB. & PROP. 36, 36–37 (2011); Jamie Hopkins, Afterlife in the
Cloud: Managing a Digital Estate, 5 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH L.J. 210, 211(2013);
Delia Băbeanu et al., Strategic Outlines: Between Value and Digital Assets
Management, 11 ANNALES UNIVERSITATIS APULENSIS SERIES OECONOMICA 318,
319 (2009).
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property.10 The analysis will be based on U.K.—mainly English—and
U.S. law. Finally, this note will evaluate western property theories and
determine whether they are applicable to email information.

I. CASE LAW: A BACKGROUND
The U.S. and the European media widely reported the U.S. case
of In Re Ellsworth as a clarification on the nature of email.11 The case,
however, did not clarify the issue of the nature of email at all. It perhaps
even complicated the matter further. In the case, Yahoo, an email provider,
initially refused to give the family of a U.S. Marine Justin Ellsworth, who
was killed in action in Iraq, access to his email account. Yahoo referred to
their terms of service, which were designed to protect the privacy of the
user by forbidding access to third parties upon death of the user.12 Yahoo
also argued that the U.S. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
prohibited them from disclosing a user’s personal communications
without a court order.13 The family argued that as his heirs, they should be
able to access the entire account, including his sent and received emails,
as his last words. Yahoo, on the other hand, had a non-survivorship policy.
What is more, Ellsworth’s account could have been deleted, contrary to
the wishes of his family. The judge in this case allowed Yahoo to enforce
their privacy policy and did not order transfer of the account username and

10

See Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals With Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 art.
2(a).
11
In re Ellsworth, No. 2005-296, 651-DE (Mich. Prob. Ct. 2005). See also, e.g.,
Who Owns Your E-mails?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2005),
http://
news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/4164669.stm; Paul Sancya, Yahoo Will Give
Family Slain Marine's E-Mail Account, USA TODAY (Apr. 21, 2005),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-04-21-marine-email_x.htm?POE=TECISVA; Tress Baldas, Slain Soldier’s E-Mail Spurs Legal
Debate: Ownership of Deceased’s Messages at Crux of Issue, 27 NAT’L L.J. 10
(2005).
12
Yahoo
Terms
of
Service,
YAHOO!
(Jan.
20,
2014),
https://policies.yahoo.com/ie/en/yahoo/terms/utos/index.htm (“No Right of
Survivorship and Non-Transferability. Your Yahoo account is non-transferable
and any rights to your Yahoo ID or contents within your account will be cancelled
upon your death. If we receive a copy of a death certificate, the relevant account
may be cancelled and all its contents permanently deleted.”).
13
See Ada Kulesza, What Happens to Your Facebook Account When You Die?,
LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 3, 2012), http://blogs.lawyers.com/2012/02/what-happensto-facebook-account-when-you-die/; Justin Atwater, Who Owns Email? Do You
Have the Right to Decide the Disposition of Your Private Digital Life?, 2006
UTAH L. REV. 397, 401 (2006).
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password. Rather, he ordered Yahoo to provide the family with a CD
containing copies of the emails in the account.14
What legal regime could explain this result? One interpretation is
that Yahoo owned the copies of the emails stored on their servers, but were
required by the court order to make the information in them available.15
For this justification can be found in the traditional division of rights in
letters. Yahoo would own the emails—as a physical representation—but
the deceased, as author, would own the copyright, transferred
subsequently to the heirs. A second interpretation is to regard the deceased
as the owner of the emails while alive, which then could be transmitted to
the heirs of the deceased upon death.16 This interpretation is less likely, as
the court would then have regarded the rights of the heirs as overriding the
terms and conditions entered into by the deceased, ordering full access to
the account. The court only ordered Yahoo to disclose the contents of the
emails, though. Thus, it can be concluded that Yahoo was found to have
ownership of the account, and the heirs’ were found to have a right to
access the content of the emails. But the court refrained from establishing
principles in relation to property, intellectual or otherwise, in email
content. Instead, it focused on privacy issues.17 Alas, the case left many
questions open and provided little guidance that could be applied
subsequently.
English law has been slightly more specific on the issue. In
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, Justice Edwards-Stuart
concluded that emails could not be considered property.18 The case
concerned a commercial dispute between an ex-employee and the new
owners of a company. The dispute involved important emails sent to the
ex-employee, which had been forwarded to his private email address and
deleted from the company server. The company claimed that the emails
should be declared the property of the company. Referring to previous
case law relating to the status of information as property in the context of
letters,19 Justice Edwards-Stuart identified a distinction between a physical
14

See Soldier's Kin to Get Access to His Emails, JUSTINELLSWORTH.NET (Apr.
21, 2005), http://www.justinellsworth.net/email/ap-apr05.htm.
15
Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9, at 123–25.
16
See id. at 123–24.
17
See generally Jonathan J. Darrow & Gerald R. Ferrera, Who Owns a Decedent’s
E-Mails: Inheritable Probate Assets or Property of the Network?, 10 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 281, 313-314 (2007); Atwater, supra note 12, at 399.
18
Fairstar Heavy Transport NV v. Adkins, [2012] EWHC (TCC) 2952 [58] (Eng).
See also Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9, at 120.
19
See, e.g., Philip v. Pennell [1907] 2 Ch 577 (Eng.); Boardman v. Phipps [1967]
2 AC 46 (Eng.); Coogan v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2012] EWCA (Civ)
48 (Eng.); Force India Formula One Team v. 1 Malaysian Racing Team [2012]
EWHC (Ch) 616 (Eng.).
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medium and the information it carried, noting that only a physical object—
paper—can be owned.20 The judge concluded that “[t]here are no
compelling practical reasons that support the existence of a proprietary
right—indeed, practical considerations militate against it.”21
Subsequently, the Court of Appeal recognized the difficulties that
property in information encounters conceptually. The court, however,
wisely avoided this discussion and decided that the real issue in the case
was that of agency. The first instance decision, therefore, provides some
guidance and an indication that in black-letter English law, emails are not
considered property. This, at a first glance, makes it clear that we need to
consider some other legal mechanisms in order to define the nature of
emails, such as copyright, contracts, or privacy.

II. COPYRIGHT IN EMAILS
Emails are perceived mainly as works22 created by their authors,
the email senders. Therefore, copyright appears to be one of the most
Fairstar EWHC (TCC) 2952 [43] (“I disagree; there is or may be an important
distinction between the physical object which carries the information - for
example, a letter - and the information which that object conveys. A letter, which
consists of paper together with the ink of the writing which is on it, is clearly a
physical object that can be owned. However, it does not follow from this that the
information which the letter conveys is also property that is capable of being the
subject of a proprietary claim (for this purpose I leave aside the possibility of any
claim arising out of copyright in respect of the contents of the letter).”; id. ¶ 58
(“In my judgment it is clear that the preponderance of authority points strongly
against there being any proprietary right in the content of information, and this
must apply to the content of an e-mail, although I would not go so far as to say
that this is now settled law. Some of the observations that I have quoted are in
terms that are less than emphatic and, of course, the two contrary views in
Boardman v Phipps are entitled to significant weight.”). See also Boardman 2 AC
46 [127]; Douglas v. Hello! Ltd. [2008] 1 AC 1 [275] (Eng.) (“That observation
still holds good in that information, even if it is confidential, cannot properly be
regarded as a form of property.”); Force India EWHC (Ch) 616 [376].
21
Fairstar EWHC (TCC) 2952 [69]. Justice Edwards-Stuart’s analysis illustrates
five different scenarios that would be the potential results if an email was
considered capable of being property. These scenarios will be discussed more in
section II.B.1.ii.
22
This note focuses on the unpublished content of emails, either in the form of an
attachment or as the text of the message, rather than content of emails that has
been published elsewhere. Although not published elsewhere, this note argues
these previously unpublished works should nevertheless be protected by
copyright as literary or musical works. See Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, c. 48, § 3 (U.K.); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Additionally, the definition of
“published” encompasses Internet publications. See, e.g., Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 175 (U.K.); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 3, Sept. 9, 1886, 25 U.S.T.
20
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obvious answers when determining the legal nature of emails. Historically,
copyright protection of unpublished works was perpetual in the common
law jurisdictions, the United Kingdom and United States.23 This has been
changed, however, and the duration has been harmonized at the EU level,
as well as with U.S. law.24 Currently, copyright in the European Union,
United Kingdom and the United States subsists in unpublished works for
the duration equal to that of copyright in published works—seventy years
after the author’s death.25 Additionally, an important change in the
European Union resulted in incentivizing the publication of unpublished
works. The Copyright Term Directive, and consequently the U.K. law,26
awarded a person an additional twenty-five years of copyright protection
for the first lawful publication of a work previously unpublished.27
Emails and attachments unpublished elsewhere, therefore, could
potentially qualify for the copyright protection as literary works.28
However, publishing to a limited number of people is not making the
content available to the public, and therefore emails would generally not
meet the requirement of publication in the United Kingdom and the United
States.29 The content could, however, still by copyrighted by meeting the
general requirements of originality and fixation, or recording.
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. See also Damien McCallig, Private but Eventually
Public: Why Copyright in Unpublished Works Matters in the Digital Age, 10
SCRIPTED 39, 43–44 (2013); Edwards & Harbinja, supra note 9, at 116.
23
Copyright protection of unpublished works was perpetual in the United
Kingdom until the adoption of The Duration of Copyright and Rights in
Performances Regulations 1995, SI 1995/3297, and in the United States until the
adoption of the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (2012), when
unpublished works were brought under the federal jurisdiction. See also Elizabeth
Townsend Gard, January 1, 2003: The Birth of the Unpublished Public Domain
and its International Consequences, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 687, 697–706
(2006).
24
See Council Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993 Harmonizing the Term
of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related Rights, 1993 O.J. (L 290) 9;
Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810, §§ 302-303 (2012).
25
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related
Rights, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 13.
26
The Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 1996, SI 1996/2967, art. 16
(UK).
27
Directive 2006/116/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 on the Term of Protection of Copyright and Certain Related
Rights, art. 4, 2006 O.J. (L 372) 12, 14.
28
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 1, § 3(1) (U.K.). 17 U.S.C. § 101
(2010).
29
See Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(publishing on the website, available to all, constituted publication for the purpose
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Fixation or recording would not create a significant obstacle, as
electronic fixation has been recognized as meeting the requirements.30 The
U.S. law mandates that a work is only fixed “when its embodiment in a
copy . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than
transitory duration.”31 The focus of this definition is on the notion of “a
period of more than transitory duration.” This has been interpreted by the
U.S. courts in a number of cases, including MAI Systems v. Peak
Computers, Inc.32 There, the court confirmed that reproduction in RAM—
Random Access Memory—are fixed copies. This finding is significant as
RAM copies are not permanent and are only present while a computer is
turned on.33
In the United Kingdom, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act
mandates that “Copyright does not subsist in a literary, dramatic or
musical work unless and until it is recorded, in writing or otherwise.”34
Writing is further defined as “any form of notation or code, whether by
hand or otherwise and regardless of the method by which, or medium in
or on which, it is recorded.”35 The statutory definition in the United
Kingdom appears clearer than the definition in the United States, referring
to any medium, therefore including digital recording as well. Accordingly,
case law provides that “an artistic work may be fixed in the source code of
a computer program.”36 Consequently, it is clear that the fixation
requirement is satisfied in the case of emails. Emails are stored “more than
transiently” on the service provider’s servers or in the “cloud,” and as such
are definitely more permanent than RAM.
Originality would arguably create a bigger issue, since many
emails contain mere information, such as facts and personal data, and
of 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). This interpretation would arguably comply with the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c. 48, § 175 (U.K.)).
30
Berne Convention in art. 2, Sept. 28, 1979, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010), Copyright,
Designs, and Patent Act, 1988, §§ 3(2), 178 (not requiring fixation, but allowing
member states to use this requirement in their national law).
31
17 U.S.C. § 101.
32
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993).
33
See also Triad Sys. v. Se. Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995);
Stenograph LLC v. Bossard Assocs., Inc., 144 F.3d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1998);
Advanced Computer Servs. v. MAI Systems, 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va.
1994); Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Lighthouse Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp.
2d 1290, 1294 (D. Utah 1999); Lowry’s Reports, Inc. v. Legg Mason, Inc., 271 F.
Supp. 2d 737, 745 (D. Md. 2003); Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom Hardware Eng’g
& Consulting, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12391, 11–12 (D. Mass. 2004).
34
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 § 3(2) (U.K.).
35
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 § 178 (U.K.).
36
SAS Inst. Inc. v. World Programming Ltd. [2013] R.P.C. 17 ¶ 29.
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probably would not pass the threshold of originality developed by the U.K.
and U.S. courts—no matter how low the threshold is.37 If we look at the
cases involving copyright in letters, it is clear that business
correspondence,38 a solicitor’s letter to his client,39 and personal letters40
pass this threshold. This can mean that emails that consist of personal or
professional correspondence and are of some length—even a few
sentences—could satisfy the requirement of originality.
Emails consisting of a single word, phrase, or sentence would
have more difficulty, however. Generally, U.K. and EU laws could
potentially protect these emails by copyright, but U.S. laws definitely
would not. In the U.K., for instance, the book title “Splendid Misery” was
denied copyright in Dick v. Yates,41 as was “the Lawyer's Diary” in Rose

37

For the US see Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony 111 U.S. 53, 59–60
(1884); Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc. 499 U.S. 340, 363 (1991) (“As
a constitutional matter, copyright protects only those constituent elements of a
work that possess more than a de minimis quantum of creativity. Rural's white
pages, limited to basic subscriber information and arranged alphabetically, fall
short of the mark.”). For the most important UK cases see Walter v. Lane [1900]
A.C. 539, 548; Univ. of London Press, Ltd. v. Univ. Tutorial Press, Ltd., [1916]
2 Ch. 601, 608; Interlego AG v. Tyco Indus. Inc. [1989] A.C. 217, 29 (P.C.);
Express Newspapers Plc v. News (U.K.) Ltd. [1991] F.S.R. 36, 43 (Ch. D.);
Newspaper Licensing Agency, Ltd. v. Marks & Spencer, Plc, [2001] UKHL 38,
[2002] R.P.C. 4 (appeal taken from Eng.). See also, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, Feist
Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of the Notion of Originality in Copyright
Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 949–82 (2002); Pamela Samuelson,
Originality Standard for Literary Works under U.S. Copyright Law, 42 AM. J.
COMP. L. SUPP. 393, 393–418 (1994); Andreas Rahmatian, Originality in UK
Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labor” Doctrine Under Pressure, 44(1) INST.
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 4 (2013); Agustin Waisman, Revisiting
Originality, 31(7) EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 370 (2009).
38
Cembrit Blunn Ltd, Dansk Eternit Holding A/S v. Apex Roofing Services LLP,
Roy Alexander Leader [2007] EWHC 111, ¶ 238 (Ch.); Tett Bros. Ltd. v. Drake
& Gorham Ltd [1928-1935] MacG. Cop. Cas. 492 (Ch.) (copyright in the
following text (omitting “Dear Sir” and “Yours etc.”) was held to be infringed:
“Further to the writer's conversation with you of to-day's date, we shall be obliged
if you will let us have full particulars and characteristics of ‘Chrystalite’ or
‘Barex.’ Also we shall be obliged if you will let s have your lower prices for 1, 2,
3, 4 and 5 ton lots and your annual contract rates. We have been using a certain
type of mineral for some time past and have not found it completely satisfactory,
and as we shall be placing an order in the very near future we shall be obliged if
you will let us have this information at your earliest convenience”).
39
Musical Fid. Ltd. v. Vickers [2002] EWCA Civ 1989; [2003] FSR 50.
40
Pope v. Curl (1741) 2 Atk. 342; Lord Perceval v. Phipps 2 V. & B. 19;
Macmillan & Co. v Dent [1907] 1 Ch. 107.
41
Dick v. Yates, [1881] 18 Ch. D 76.
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v. Information Services Limited,42 while in other cases, headings were
given the status of literary work and protected by copyright.43 The
European Court of Justice has subsequently provided some guidance for
this issue in the case of Infopaq International A/S v. Danske Dagblades
Forening.44 The court opined that certain sentences or even parts of them
could be copyrightable, depending on the originality of a respective
sentence.45 This decision has been followed by the English High Court and
The Court of Appeal in The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v.
Meltwater Holding BV & Ors.46 The High Court applied the Infopaq test
and concluded that “[H]eadlines are capable of being literary works.”47
The judge went even further holding that “it appears that a mere 11 word
extract may now be sufficient in quantity provided it includes an
expression of the intellectual creation of the author.”48 The U.S. Copyright
Office, on the other hand, outright denies registration of copyright in
names, titles, and short phrases.49 But even in the United Kingdom, single
words are generally refused copyright protection—for example,
“Exxon.”50

42

Rose v. Info. Servs. Ltd., [1987] F.S.R. 254 (Ch.).
Shetland Times Ltd. v. Wills, [1997] F.S.R. 604. (S.C.).
44
Infopaq Int’l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening (Case C-5/08) [2012] Bus.
L.R. 102 [2009] E.C.R.
45
See id. ¶ 47
[T]he possibility may not be ruled out that certain isolated sentences, or even
certain parts of sentences in the text in question, may be suitable for conveying to
the reader the originality of a publication such as a newspaper article, by
communicating to that reader an element which is, in itself, the expression of the
intellectual creation of the author of that article. Such sentences or parts of
sentences are, therefore, liable to come within the scope of the protection provided
for in article 2(a) of that Directive.
46
The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd. & Ors v. Meltwater Holding BV & Ors,
[2010] EWHC 3099 (Ch.); [2011] EWCA Civ 890.
47
Id. ¶ 71.
48
Id. ¶ 77.
49
See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, Copyright Protection Not Available for Names,
Titles,
or
Short
Phrases,
CIRCULAR
34
(2012),
http://copyright.gov/circs/circ34.pdf; Becker v. Loew's, Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 893
(7th Cir. 1943); Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175 F. 276, 278 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909);
Corbett v. Purdy, C.C., 80 F. 901 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897); Osgood v. Allen, 18 F.
Cas. 871, 875–76 (C.C.D. Me. 1872) (No. 10,603); Warner Bros. Pictures v.
Majestic Pictures Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 311 (2d Cir. 1934); Harper v. Ranous, 67
F. 904, 905 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1895); Patten v. Superior Talking Pictures, 8 F. Supp.
196, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
50
See Exxon Corp. v. Exxon Ins. Consultants Int’l Ltd., [1982] Ch. 119 (holding
the word Exxon does not qualify for copyright protection as an “original literary
work.”).
43
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Authors of emails could also retain moral rights, on which the
U.K. and U.S. have similar laws. In the United Kingdom, moral rights
include: the right to be identified as the author,51 the right to object to
derogatory treatment of the work,52 and the right against false attribution
of work.53 The first two rights subsist as long as the copyright lasts—70
seventy years post-mortem, and the last one lasts until twenty years after
the author’s death.54 Unless a person waives his moral rights55— the right
to be identified as the author and the right to object to derogatory treatment
of the work transmit upon death, passing onto the person as directed by
will, or a person to whom the copyright passes, or it exercisable by a
personal representative.56 The right against false attribution is only
exercisable by a personal representative, pursuant to the same provision of
the CDPA. The U.S. Copyright Act contains a similar provision as to the
types of moral rights conferred to the authors. However, these rights expire
upon the author’s death.57
To conclude, despite long emails meeting the requirement of
originality and fixation, there would be a regulatory vacuum for a
significant number of short emails. Therefore, copyright is insufficient to
protect all email communication, necessitating a look at alternative legal
mechanisms available to protect this content.

III. PROPERTY IN EMAILS
Black-letter law may suggest users may own property in an
email’s personal data and information.58 Together with a copyright regime,
this may serve to protect all kinds of email. There may be problems,
though, with categorizing email as property.

A. Law on Personal Data as Property
Personal data consists of a user’s name, address, date of birth,
genetic data, religious beliefs, photos, among other things. It is
51

Copyright, Design and Patent Act, 1988, c. 48 § 77 (U.K.).
Id. § 80.
53
Id. § 84.
54
Id.
55
Id. § 87.
56
Id. § 95.
57
17 U.S.C. § 106A.
58
Information encompasses data, ideas, facts, and news, but does not necessarily
used in the same manner by the information science literature. Nimmer and
Krauthaus distinguish, amongst other criteria they use, differentiation of
information by the form of information (summarized data, analyzed data,
unorganized and organized raw data). See Raymond T. Nimmer & Patricia A.
Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of Commercial Law,
55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 110 (Summer 1992).
52
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traditionally protected by legal regimes based on protection of privacy,
undergirded by models based on human rights, torts or contracts. European
countries mainly perceive privacy and control over personal data as a
human right—establishing the EU-wide data protection regime, which is
currently in the process of a comprehensive reform.59 The United States,
on the other hand, has been using a tort law model.60 The tort model,
however, has recently penetrated English law in Google Inc v. Vidal-Hall
& Ors,61 where the Court of Appeal recognized the “tort of misuse of
private information.” This decision has a potential to revolutionize English
law on the protection of personal data.
Although protected under a tort-privacy right, personal data have
not traditionally been protected under a property right. The advantage of a
property regime is that, unlike a tort-privacy regime, there is no need for
individuals to demonstrate harm in order to be able to protect their
property—and this holds for both U.S. and U.K. legal regimes.62 But for
the property rights model to adhere, personal data must compose an asset
or commodity.63 This has been the subject of extensive debate.
Nevertheless, proponents argue that a property regime would enable
individuals to better control the use of personal data and to better share in
the profits resulting from such use, and would force companies to
internalize these new costs when deciding to collect or use others’ personal
data.64 In addition, since property rights are rights in rem and can be
enforced against anyone, proponents argue that individuals could protect

59

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8, Dec. 7, 2000.
See, e.g., Corien Prins, Privacy and Property: European Perspectives and the
Commodification of our Identity, in THE FUTURE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 223,
223–57 (Lucie Guibault & Bernt Hugenholtz eds., 2006).
60
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 652A-652E (1977); Andrew J. McClurg, A
Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63 (2003).
61
Google v. Vidal-Hall, 2015 WL 1310650 (2015).
62
See id. at 247.
63
See, e.g., WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW
ASSET CLASS 5, 7, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ITTC_Personal
DataNewAsset_Report_2011.pdf.
64
Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1128 (1999).
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their data not only against data controllers,65 but against third parties as
well.66
Most of these “propertization” arguments originate in the United
States, although there are some examples in the European context. For
example, Prins characterizes the EU regime as utilitarian—as it aims to
promote the free flow of personal data—and therefore more receptive to a
property regime than that of the United States.67 Similarly, Purtova argues
it would enable better control of personal data within the European Union,
despite differences in property concepts between common and civil law
countries.68 She argues primarily for introducing the protective features of
property with respect to third parties, rather than its alienability feature.69
In an earlier work, this author has argued that due to the introduction of
the right to be forgotten and data portability rights, the proposed data
protection regulation is moving towards the propertization of personal
data.70
There are, nevertheless, notable disadvantages of the property
model. For example, this model may produce monopolization of
“Data controllers” is the EU data protection concept, meaning “the natural or
legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone or jointly
with others determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data;
where the purposes and means of processing are determined by national or
Community laws or regulations, the controller or the specific criteria for his
nomination may be designated by national or Community law.” See The Data
Protection Direction 95/46/EC, art. 2 d, 1995 (E.U.) (directive on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free
movement of such data).
66
See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical
Analysis of the 'Right to Be Forgotten' in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 256,
256–58 (2011). Or for the U.S. perspective, see CHRIS CONLEY, THE RIGHT TO
DELETE
(2010),
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/view/1158.
67
Prins, supra note 59, at 245.
68
See Nadezhda Purtova, Property in Personal Data: Second Life of an Old Idea
in the Age of Cloud Computing, Chain Informatisation, and Ambient Intelligence,
in COMPUTERS, PRIVACY AND DATA PROTECTION: AN ELEMENT OF CHOICE 61
(Serge Gutwirth et al. eds., 2011) (“Property, with some limitations resolved by
regulation, due to its erga omnes effect and fragmentation of property rights, has
the potential to reflect and control this complexity of relationships. This may be
considered an instance of property exercising its protective rather than market
function; it aims at making sure that even after transfer of a fraction of rights, a
data subject always retains basic control over his personal information.”).
69
Id.
70
Edina Harbinja, Does the EU Data Protection Regime Protect Post-Mortem
Privacy and What Could Be The Potential Alternatives?, 10 SCRIPTED J. L. Tech.
& Soc’y 19, 19 (2013).
65
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information and prevent freedom of speech.71 Additionally, the property
model may encourage transactions in personal data, which arguably
should be discouraged. The principle of alienability would allow the
purchaser to then sell the data again, attenuating control of the original
owner.72 This argument, however, presumes the full alienability of
property. This does not have to be the case.73 Personal data could be
subject to “hybrid alienability,”74 or a model resembling the limited rights
granted under copyright law, rather than a “traditional” property right that
would completely divorce the original owner from all control.75
In summary, personal data has never been legally protected as
property. Instead, protection of personal data has been provided through
data protection legislation, as torts or by breach of confidence.
Propertization arguments remained at the theoretical level, without an
influence to the legislation or case law.76 It puts forth workable ideas, such
as “hybrid alienability,” but evidence also suggests many problems in
conceiving personal data as property. These problems notably include a
conflict with the human right of privacy. Propertization of personal data,
therefore, remains a theoretical construct, and a rather unsuccessful one so
far.

B. Law on Information as Property
Information is not generally regarded as property in black-letter
law, and especially within the English common law. For instance, in
71

See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
Samuelson, supra note 64, at 1136; Jessica Litman, Information
Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1304 (2000); see also Julie
E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52
STAN. L. REV. 1373,1391 (2000).
73
See, e.g., Jane B. Baron, Property as Control: The Case of Information, 18
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 367, 382–83 (2012); Paul M. Schwartz,
Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2093 (2004);
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1985) (arguing that “alienability is not a binary switch to be
turned on or off, but rather a dimension of property ownership that can be adjusted
in many different ways”); Lee Ann Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 1403, 1408 (2009).
74
Schwartz, supra note 73, at 2094–98 (discussing model of property rights in
personal data, which would “permit the transfer for an initial category of use in
personal data, but only if the customer is granted an opportunity to block further
transfer or use by unaffiliated entities”).
75
See Cohen, supra note 72, at 1428–29.
76
See id. at 21 (“Post-mortem privacy (deceased persons’ privacy), has been, so
far, a phenomenon of interest predominantly for sociologists, psychologists,
anthropologists and other humanities and social sciences scholars. This issues,
nevertheless, deserves the attention of legal scholarship . . . .”).
72
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Boardman v Phipps,77 the court maintained that information is not
property in any normal sense, but equity will restrain its transmission to
another if in breach of some confidential relationships.78 There are some
earlier authorities in English common law conferring proprietary character
to certain kinds of information. These include Jeffrey v. Rolls Royce Ltd,79
where Lord Redcliffe was treated as an asset distinct from the physical
records it was contained80; Herbert Morris Ltd v. Saxelby,81 where trade
secrets were considered “his master’s property”82; and Dean v.
MacDowell,83 where information constituted property of the partnership.84
An infamous case where an English court found property in information
is Exchange Telegraph Co. v. Gregory & Co.85 There, the Court of Appeal
upheld an injunction to restrain the defendant broker from publishing
information—the quotations in stocks and shares from the Stock
Exchange—on the grounds that the information was the plaintiff’s
property.86 However, this stance has not been supported in most of the
subsequent case law.87 Other rules of law, like contract, tort and breach of
confidence, are desired instead.88
In the United States, authorities asserting information as property
vary significantly among the individual states, but courts are generally
more willing to recognize certain kinds of information as property. In U.S.
International News Service. v. Associated Press,89 the Supreme Court held
that fresh news could be regarded as quasi-property, provided that
misappropriation by a competitor constitutes unfair competition.90 Both
77

[1967] 2 AC 46 (HL) (appeal taken from England).
Id. at 128.
79
[1962] 1 AER 801 (HL) (appeal taken from England).
80
Id. at 805.
81
[1916] 1 AC 688 (HL) (appeal taken from England).
82
Id. at 714.
83
(1878) 8 Ch D 345 (Eng.).
84
Id. at 354.
85
[1896] 1 QB 147.
86
See id. at 152–53 (Lord Esher M.R.) (“This information . . . is something which
can be sold. It is property, and being sold to the plaintiffs it was their property.
The defendant has, with intention, invaded their right of property in it, and he has
done so surreptitiously and meanly.”).
87
Paul Kohler & Norman Palmer, Information as Property, in INTERESTS IN
GOODS 7 (Norman Palmer & Ewan McKendrick eds., 2d ed. 1993).
88
Id. at 4–5.
89
248 US 215 (1918).
90
See id. at 236 (“Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out of which
both parties are seeking to make profits at the same time and in the same field, we
hardly can fail to recognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must be
regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of either as against the
public.”). There, the Court used a classical Lockean justification for establishing
78
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state and federal courts have adopted the doctrine as a general rule of
unfair competition, thus granting protection to objects outside the reach of
intellectual property protection. But it has been widely criticized for its
lack of analysis and superficiality.91 There is a fear this doctrine protects
objects that intellectual property will not,92 potentially restricting access to
the public domain and upsetting the balance intellectual property law
attempts to achieve.93 The doctrine has been a subject of wide controversy
in American academic writing.94 Nonetheless, lower courts have followed
the rule of misappropriation set forth in International News Service.95
In contrast to the misappropriation theory under U.S. law, England
established the doctrine of “breach of confidence,” aimed at providing
protection for valuable information.96 Breach of confidence is an equitable
doctrine that can be described as similar to the American “trade secret law”
doctrine.97 In this way, a recent Court of Appeal case decided that
confidential information should be regarded as a type of intellectual

quasi-property in news, invoking the pains and labor that were taken advantage
of by the plaintiff’s competitor. The case was a base for developing the doctrine
of misappropriation in the United States.
91
Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics
of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 25 (1991).
92
Such as fact, for instance. See Int’l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215,
250 (1918) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The general rule of law is, that the noblest
of human productions—knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas—
become, after voluntary communications to others, free as the air to common
use.”).
93
See infra notes 152 to 173 and accompanying text.
94
See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy
of International News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 411, 411
(1983); Edmund J. Sease, Misappropriation is Seventy-Five Years Old; Should
We Bury It or Revive It?, 70 N.D. L. REV. 781, 781 (1994); Raymond A. Be,
Dead or Alive?: The Misappropriation Doctrine Resurrected in Texas, 33 HOUS.
L. REV. 447, 449 (1996).
95
Rex Y. Fujichaku, The Misappropriation Doctrine in Cyberspace: Protecting
the Commercial Value of “Hot News” Information, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 421, 447
(1998). Most of the cases where courts did recognize a misappropriation action
involved either appropriation of breaking news or sports performances, likely
because that information was a source of revenue for media companies. See, e.g.,
Assoc. Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev’d on other grounds,
299 U.S. 269 (1936); Pottstown Daily News Publ’g Co. v. Pottstown Broad. Co.,
192 A.2d 657 (Pa. 1963); 202 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F.
Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); Twentieth Century Sporting Club v. Transradio Press
Serv., 300 N.Y.S. 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1937).
96
CHARLOTTE WAELDE ET AL, CONTEMPORARY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW
AND POLICY 774 (3rd ed. 2013).
97
Id. at 775–76.
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property.98 This, however, is an exceptional decision, and it does not
follow the principles established in the bulk of English case law. Indeed,
English courts seem to agree that information cannot be considered
property,99 and arguably, that protection instead lies in tort law. For
example, in OBG v Allan, the court stated that “[i]nformation, even if it is
confidential, cannot properly be regarded as a form of property.”100
Similarly, in Moorgate Tobacco v Philip Morris, the court, writing about
breach of confidence, declared that confidence’s “rational basis does not
lie in proprietary right.” Rather, “it lies in the notion of an obligation of
conscience arising from the circumstances in or through which the
information was communicated or obtained.”101
As stated before, the doctrine of trade secrets is the American
counterpart to breach of confidence in England. The Uniform Trade
Secrets Act broadly defines trade secrets as any information that is secret,
derives economic value from secrecy, and is the subject of reasonable
measures to maintain its secrecy.102 Trade secrets can protect many types
of information,103 and arguably evolved from a property regime in the
nineteenth century to a combination of contracts, torts and property, and
eventually to the unfair competition approach adopted by the Restatement
of Torts in 1939.104 In England that shift never happened, and trade secrets
remain protected by the breach of confidence doctrine.

98

Coogan v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 48 (Eng.).
See, e.g., M. Conaglen, Thinking about Proprietary Remedies for Breach of
Confidence, 1 INTELL. P ROP. Q. 82, 84 (2008) (“[T]he prevailing modern view is
that the foundation of the doctrine of confidence does not rest in the protection of
property.”); SNELL'S EQUITY, 16-07–16-11 (J.A. McGhee ed., 2004); W. Cornish
& D. Llewelyn, INTELLECTUAL P ROPERTY: P ATENTS, COPYRIGHT, T RADE
MARKS AND ALLIED R IGHTS, 8-50–54 (2007).
100
OBG Ltd. v. Allan [2007] UKHL 21 at 275 (Eng.).
101
Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd. (No.2) [1984] 156 C.L.R.
414, 438 (Eng.). See also Boardman v. Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46, 89–90, 102, 127–
28 (Eng.); Breen v. Williams [1996] 186 C.L.R. 71, 81, 91, 111–12, 129; Cadbury
Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd. [1999] 167 D.L.R. (4th) 577 [48]; Douglas v.
Hello! Ltd. (No.3) [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595 (Eng.); [2006] Q.B. 125 [119, 126].
102
Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 529 § 1(4) (2005). However, U.S. courts
tend to instead use the negative definition, defining trade secrets “by what [they
are] not.” D. S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly
Important, 27 B ERKELEY T ECH. L.J. 1091, 1107 (2012).
103
See id. (explaining trade secrets cover items such as chemical formulas, source
code, methods, prototypes, pre-release pricing, financials, budgets, contract
terms, business plans, market analyses, salaries, information about suppliers and
customers, experiments, positive and negative experimental results, engineering
specifications, laboratory notebooks, and recipes).
104
Restatement of Torts § 757 (1939).
99
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Trade secret doctrine’s proprietary roots can be seen in certain
American decisions that describe trade secrets as primarily property. 105
One of the earliest cases deeming trade secrets to be property is Peabody
v. Norfolk.106 There, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court defined a
principle applicable to property law in general.107 Regarding trade secrets,
the court said that the inventor or discoverer of secret information does not
have exclusive rights against the public or the good faith acquirer, “but he
has a property in it, which a court of chancery will protect against one who
in violation of contract and breach of confidence undertakes to apply it to
his own use, or to disclose it to third persons.”108 Later, the courts
continued to connect trade secrets to property. In 1984, The Supreme
Court held that trade secrets are property for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment’s Takings Clause.109 Additionally, since trade secrets are
intangible, the Court stated that the existence of a property right depends
on the extent to which the trade secret is protected from disclosure.110
Despite its proprietary origins and select decisions throughout the
years, U.S. courts have never decided with certainty whether confidential
information or trade secrets are property. In addition to intellectual
property, American academia has counted it as part of torts, or something
that belongs in the criminal law domain.111 Commentators assert trade
105

See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. b (1993)
(describing early trade secret theory as based on property rights); Carpenter v.
United States, 484 U.S. 19, 26 (1987) ("Confidential business information has
long been recognized as property."); Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion,
Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 890, 897 (Minn. 1983) ("In defining the existence of a trade
secret as the threshold issue, we first focus upon the "property rights" in the trade
secret rather than on the existence of a confidential relationship."); IMED Corp.
v. Sys. Eng’g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d (Ala. 1992) ("Our conclusion in this
regard is consistent with the purpose of the act—to protect individual property
rights in trade secrets . . . .").
106
98 Mass. 452, 457–58 (1868).
107
See id. at 457 ("If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his
skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as
property.").
108
Id. at 458.
109
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002–03 (1984) (citing Locke’s
Second Treatise and other sources to support the finding that trade secrets can be
property). See also J. W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust Enrichment, and the
Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J. L. & T ECH. 2 (1999).
110
Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002; see also Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 474–76 (1974) (noting the importance of secrecy to the value of trade
secrets).
111
See, e.g., Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act,
8 HARV. J. L. & T ECH. 427, 435–42 (1995); David D. Friedman et al., Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. P ERSP. 61 (1991); Gale R. Peterson,
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secret law involves elements of similar areas: property, contract, tort,
fiduciary duty, and criminal law.112 American trade secret law may after
all be a fusion of tort and unjust enrichment law.113 Still some believe this
inquiry is not essential and that what matters is that the information is
actually protected.114 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that many authors
still argue that trade secrets are intellectual property rights.115
All things considered, U.S. courts and legislators have been more
willing to recognize information as property. But the property paradigm
cannot be used for all kinds of information and for all cases because it
relates to commercially valuable information mainly. Although the
property paradigm may succeed in the future,116 only tangible objects are

Trade Secrets in an Information Age, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 385 (1995); E. W. Kitch,
The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J. LEGAL S TUD.
683 (1980); W. B. Barton, A Study in the Law of Trade Secrets, 13 U. C IN. L.
REV. 507, 558 (1939); C. T. Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and
Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. P ROP. L. 39 (2007); M. Risch, Why Do We Have
Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. P ROP. REV. 1 (2007); V. Chiappetta, Myth,
Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian?: A Normative Framework
Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69 (1999); Hill, supra note
109; C. Montville, Reforming the Law of Proprietary Information, 56 DUKE L.J.
1159 (2007); M. P. Simpson, Trade Secrets, Property Rights, and Protectionism
– an Age-Old Tale, 70 B ROOK. L. REV. 1121 (2005); J. Chally, The Law of Trade
Secrets: Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. R EV. 1269 (2004).
112
See Hill, supra note 109.
113
See id. The legislation of trade secrets has been quite a recent phenomenon in
the US. Before 1980, there was no legislation on this matter. The initial efforts to
codify and harmonize trade secrets law was that of the Uniform Law Commission,
which in 1979 adopted the uniform Trade Secrets Act. Following this important
event, forty-seven states in total enacted civil statutes and over a half of these
states also have specific criminal provision on trade secrets. In addition, in 1996,
Congress passed a federal statute criminalizing trade secret misappropriation,
Economic Espionage Act 18 U.S.C. 55 1831-39. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
14 U.L.A. § 529 (2005); D. S. Almeling et al., A Statisical Analysis of Trade
Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 57, 67–68 (2011).
114
See AMEDEE E. TURNER, T HE LAW OF T RADE SECRETS 12 (1962); E.I. du
Pont de Nemours Co. v. Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917); see also Nature of
Trade Secrets and Their Protection, 42 HARV. L. REV. 254 (1928) (noting that
property theories of trade secret protection have limitations and that, in the end, it
may not matter whether courts regard trade secrets as property, provided they
protect them).
115
See Mark A. Lemley & Phillip J. Weiser, Should Property or Liability Rules
Govern Information?, 85 T EX. L. REV. 783, 789 (2007).
116
Kohler & Palmer, supra note 87, at 206 (noting that the information might be
deemed to be property in the future, and it would provide the courts with an
additional instrument).
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currently protected with certainty,117 leaving the protection of intangible
information uncertain.118

C. The Fairstar Case
The question of whether new, intangible information such as
emails should be regarded as property arose in the recent English case,
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v Adkins.119 This section will examine the
scenarios identified by the court in more detail. Justice Edwards-Stuart’s
analysis of property in emails illustrates five different scenarios: 1) the title
remains with the creator; 2) the title passes to the recipient (analogous to
a letter); 3) the recipient had a license to use the content of the email, 4)
the sender has a license to retain the content and use it, and 5) the title is
shared between the sender and the recipient, as well as any subsequent
recipient.120
In each of these scenarios, Judge Edwards-Stuart focused on the
unwanted consequences that would follow if the information in emails
were to be recognized as property. Under the first scenario, (the creator
of the email content retains property in it) he noted that the in rem nature
of property would entitle the sender to request deletion of the email. The
judge noted that this “would be very strange—and far reaching.”121 Under
the second scenario (the recipient has the property right), he pointed out,
similarly, that the recipient would instead be entitled to request deletion.
In addition to that “strange outcome”, he noted that further complications
would arise if the email were forwarded to many recipients, who in turn
might forward it to even more recipients. There, “the question of who had
the title in its contents at any one time would become hopelessly
confused.”122 Under the third and fourth scenarios (recipient and sender,
respectively, have license to use the content), Justice Edwards-Stuart
noted that a property concept and a confidentiality concept would be
redundant. Namely, if information was confidential then property offers
no extra protections, and if the information was not confidential then there
would be almost no need to use property’s protections. He concluded that
a change to a property regime was not necessary in light of these options,
stating that “there is no compelling need or logic for adopting either of
117

See Thurston v. Charles [1905] 21 T.L.R. 659; British Steel Corp. v. Granada
Television Ltd. [1981] A.C. 1096, 1105 per Megarry V.C. (Eng.); Kohler &
Palmer, supra note 87, at 188.
118
See Kohler & Palmer, supra note 87, at 188.
119
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, [2012] EWHC (TCC) 2952, [64]
(Eng.).
120
Id. at 61.
121
Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins, [2012] EWHC (TCC) 2952, [64]
(Eng.).
122
Id. ¶ 66.
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options (3) or (4) and so in relation to these options I would reject a plea
that the law is out of line with the state of technology in the 21st century.”123
Under the fifth scenario (shared proprietary interests in email
contents), Justice Edwards-Stuart discussed several possible consequences
of the loss of information in emails due to technology issues. He argued
that, in such cases, the affected party could not gain access to the servers
of the parties with whom he shared property in emails. He concluded that
“the ramifications would be considerable and, I would have thought, by
no means beneficial.”124 Accordingly, he concluded that emails are not to
be considered property.125
Subsequently, the Court of Appeal recognized the same
conceptual difficulties.126 However, the Court further asserted that this
does not mean that there can never be property in any kind of information,
as the inquiry depends on the quality of the information in question.127 This
would mean that information such as “know-how” might be susceptible to
property, as opposed to personal data.128 Accordingly, the Court wisely
avoided this discussion and decided that the real issue in the case was that
of agency, stating an agent must allow the principal access to information
sent on its behalf.129 In another, even more recent case, the Court of Appeal
confirmed this long-standing position and, in relation to the customer data
contained within a database, maintained that information is not regarded

123

Id. ¶ 67.
Id. ¶ 68.
125
Id. ¶ 69.
126
“The claim to property in intangible information presents obvious definitional
difficulties, having regard to the criteria of certainty, exclusivity, control and
assignability that normally characterize property rights and distinguish them from
personal rights.” Fairstar Heavy Transport N.V. v. Adkins [2013] EWCA (Civ)
886, [47].
127
Id. ¶ 48.
128
Id.
129
“In my view, it is unfortunate that the agreed wording of the preliminary issue
introduced an unnecessary complication into the dispute. The reference to a
‘proprietary right’ was a distraction from the centrality of the agency relationship
and its legal incidents. No competing claims of third parties are involved.
Fairstar's claim is against Mr Adkins. The assertion of a right to inspect and copy
the content of the emails on his computer relating to its business affairs arises
from the legal incidents of an agency relationship that survive its termination. That
question can be decided, as between those parties, without a jurisprudential debate
about the legal characteristics of ‘property,’ or whether the content of the emails
was ‘information’ in which property existed in this case or could exist at all.” Id.
¶ 46.
124
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as property in English law.130 Conversely, the medium carrying
information is an object of property.131
In conclusion, it can be generally argues that the U.K. courts do
not consider information property, whereas U.S. law has done so more
readily.

IV. THEORIES OF PROPERTY APPLIED TO INFORMATION
In this section, different theories are put forth to determine
whether one may undergird a property conception of information in
emails. None, however, are sufficient to accomplish this.

A. Property as a “Bundle of Sticks”
The particular framework used to examine these stances is the
most widely accepted conception of property in common law systems: the
“bundle of sticks” theory. In the information context, this theory
encompasses the following ‘sticks’: the control of copying, access,
modification, use, and disclosure of data and information.132
Providing for all of the sticks in the bundle of information context
is usually a complex task, if possible at all, due to the characteristics that
differentiate information from traditional, tangible property. For example,
information is non-rivalrous,133 as possession can be concurrent and
“An electronic database consists of structured information. Although
information may give rise to intellectual property rights, such as database right
and copyright, the law has been reluctant to treat information itself as property.
When information is created and recorded there are sharp distinctions between the
information itself, the physical medium on which the information is recorded and
the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical medium and the
rights are treated as property, the information itself has never been. As to this, see
most recently per Lord Walker in OBG Ltd v Allan [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1
A.C. 1 at [275], where he is dealing with the appeal in Douglas v Hello, and the
discussion of this topic in Green & Randall, The Tort of Conversion at pages 141144." Your Response Ltd. v. Datateam Bus. Media Ltd. [2014] EWCA (Civ) 281
[42] (Lord Justice Floyd) (appeal taken from Brighton Cty. Ct.) (Eng.).
131
“When information is created and recorded there are sharp distinctions
between the information itself, the physical medium on which the information is
recorded and the rights to which the information gives rise. Whilst the physical
medium and the rights are treated as property, the information itself has never
been.” Id.
132
See Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 58, at 113.
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See James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of
the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 41 (2003); R. Grant
Hammond, Quantum Physics, Econometric Models and Property Rights to
Information, 27 MCGILL L.J. 47, 54 (1981); Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1059–60 (2005).
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cannot be transferred as in the case of tangible property;134 information is
often non-separable, acting as a part of an individual right holder;135
copying information is easy and not very costly;136 information is often
time-limited, erasable, and more fluid;137 information is not easily
excludable, requiring legal measures to mandate its excludability;138
information generally does not depreciate with use and sometimes even
gains additional value with use;139 and information is not scarce.140
These differences make it difficult to apply the traditional property
“sticks” (such as use, control, exclusion, possession, destruction) to
information. On this basis, courts frequently deny information a status of
property. Nevertheless, major western theories can still be evaluated in
their ability to establish property rights in information.141

B. Labor Theory
This section evaluates labor theory as a justification of the
propertization of information, as it is widely used.142 According to Locke,
134

Nimmer & Krauthaus, supra note 58, at 105.
“Separability” or “thinghood”, means that the things, in order to be property,
must not be conceived as “an aspect of ourselves or our ongoing personality-rich
relationships to others.” J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAW 126 (1997).
136
See Hammond, supra note 133, at 54. Usually, with the exception of highly
confidential and protected information, where it could be considerably harder and
costlier.
137
Persistence is another quality of property objects, both tangible and intangible.
It does not mean permanence; it only implies a certain degree of stability. See
Theodore J. Westbrook, Owned: Finding a Place for Virtual World Property
Rights, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 779, 782–83 (2006).
138
For more on excludability, see Boyle, supra note 133, at 42. For Hammond,
public goods are separated from private goods by a principle of exclusion and for
information to have this feature, a considerable cost would need to occur.
Hammond, supra note 133, at 54.
139
See Boyle, supra note 133, at 44.
140
See Hammond, supra note 133, at 53.
141
This discussion will borrow from the normative justifications for the
recognition of intellectual property. The reason for this is that the same major
property theories have been used to justify both intellectual property rights and
propertization. In addition to the same rationale, intellectual property variants of
these theories are even more suitable in the information context, given that
intellectual property resources share many of the same features as information, as
they too are intangible, non-rivalrous, and non-permanent.
142
Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Geo. L.J. 287
(1989); William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 296–329 (Stephen R. Munzer
ed., 2007); Seana V. Shiffrin, Lockean Arguments for Private Intellectual
Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
138, 138–39 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2007).
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a creator owns his person and his labor. Because inventions and
intellectual creations are products of labor, the creator owns them
according to this theory. But when applying this to information generally,
one encounters problems.
First, information such as facts, news, or things not qualifying as
intellectual property may not entail labor. With information, there is no
laboring on independent physical materials.143 Other problems may arise
with Locke’s proviso concerning spoilage, as intellectual property and
information are not subject to spoilage in the material sense. Although
spoilage may occur if the creator fails to use all of the owned information
in productive ways,144 only the complete non-usage of works would result
in spoilage, which would be rare.145
Though this Lockean proviso may not exactly apply, concerns
over the failure to properly use information are warranted. Some types of
information (for example, trade secrets or personal data) may lose their
usefulness and function if not used in the right time and exploited properly,
a scenario that relates back to the tragedy of the commons arguments. 146
However, the “commons” analogy and its prescriptions may not be
equipped to address these concerns, as it does with tangible property, for
it is very difficult to define the commons abstractly in the case of
information. We could borrow from intellectual property theory and
consider the commons equivalent to the IP public domain. However, this
approach would encounter similar difficulties that the public domain faces.
The main objection is that the Lockean commons referred to appropriation
“The Lockean labor theory applies more easily because the common of ideas
seems inexhaustible.” Hughes, supra note 142, at 51. For a more detailed
discussion, see Shiffrin, supra note 142, at 140, 141, or GREGORY S. ALEXANDER
& EDUARDO. M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY THEORY 191, 192
(2012).
144
Benjamin G. Damstedt, Limiting Locke: A Natural Law Justification for the
Fair Use Doctrine, 112 YALE L.J. 1179, 1182, 1183 (2003).
145
ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 58 (2011).
146
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the US, created by Garrett Hardin. A tragedy of the commons is a situation
appearing when too many owners have a privilege to use a resource and no one
has a right to exclude another. This leads to overuse and depletion of the resource.
Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1248 (1968).
Demsetz also discusses intellectual property. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory
of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 359 (1967). See also F. Scott Kieff,
Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L.
REV. 697 (2001); Edmund Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683, 683–723 (1980); William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud.
325, 353 (1989).
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in an earlier stage of societal development, and to tangible assets only, thus
being inapplicable to the public domain and, consequently, to the case of
information commons.147
Locke’s proviso concerning limitation on appropriation, however,
may nevertheless apply.148 Although, theoretically, the “enough and as
good” proviso is likely to be satisfied due to information not being scarce,
thus rendering the proviso unnecessary, scarcity may still occur with
negative consequences if appropriation prevents the dissemination of
important information.149 For instance, some information could be
necessary for self-preservation and subsistence, as required by Locke,
making its appropriation harmful to the welfare of others. As a result, there
would not be “enough and as good” left for others in the commons if the
access were to be limited by property rights.150 This is especially true if
propertization would, as suggested by many prominent commentators,
jeopardize free speech, expression, sharing of knowledge and keeping
archives and accurate history records.151
Generally, labor theory could be employed to justify property in
certain kinds of information, where labor that could qualify as adequate
for the purpose of labor theory (e.g., trade secrets) is present. However,
general application to all kinds of information is unsuitable. Finally, the
commons is even more problematic in the case of personal data, as such
data is, by definition, tied to an individual and does not belong to everyone.
Accordingly, labor theory is even less applicable to personal data.

C. Utilitarian Theory
This section will first explain the utilitarian theories used to justify
intellectual property and will then draw parallels with applying the theory
to propertizing information. Inspired by Bentham, utilitarians and the
neoclassical law and economics school argue that the main purpose of
awarding intellectual property protection is incentivizing innovation.152 In
147
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257, 269 (2008).
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Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?, (2003-2004) 1 U. Ottawa. L & Tech.
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order to achieve this, they argue that the law must recognize limited
monopoly rights in creations and enable creators to recoup their
investments.153 These assumptions underpinned legislation as early as the
first modern copyright act, the Statute of Anne in 1709.154 Furthermore,
the U.S. Constitution explicitly based its copyright and patent regimes on
utilitarian foundations.155
Utilitarian theory often develops on the notion of free riding and
the aforementioned tragedy of the commons.156 Free riding disables the
creator from internalizing the full benefits of their creations, resulting in
underinvestment.157 If intellectual property protection were not awarded,
those who did not create could still enjoy the benefits. The creators, on the
other hand, would be unable to recover the investments, efforts and costs
they incur in the process of creating and innovating.158 Consequently, no
creators would invest in creating.159 Thus, intellectual property protection
eliminates this phenomenon, increasing the production of socially
valuable intellectual property.160
How much intellectual property protection to afford, however, is
up for debate. Landes and Posner recognize the central aim of copyright
law as striking a balance between public and private interests.161 This
balance is struck when net welfare is maximized, resulting in “the greatest
good for the greatest number.”162 For example, in the context of copyright,
this means that intellectual property rules should be geared to “maximize
the benefits from creating additional works minus both the losses from
limiting access and the costs of administering copyright protection.”163
Again, intellectual property achieves this by allowing the creator to
internalizing positive externalities.164 But some scholars maintain that
153
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positive externalities are impossible to internalize, and that at any rate,
consumption of creative outputs by many is desirable, as it enriches
society and culture.165 Therefore, as the scholar Lemley states, “[I]f ‘free
riding’ means merely obtaining a benefit from another’s investment, the
law does not, cannot, and should not prohibit it.”166
Other opponents of using an exclusionary property right find that
it is incomplete in striking an appropriate balance between private and
public in the copyright context.167 The problem in these justifications for
copyright, as scholars Boyle or Zemer would argue, is that they emphasize
the property component as a precondition for incentivizing creation, thus
disregarding the role of the public domain168 or the self-interested
motivation for creation without legal incentives. 169
In addition, critics deny that intellectual property protection is
always necessary to recover the cost of innovation.170 This claim mainly
relates to patents, as they are understood to require the highest level of
investment in relation to other intellectual property rights.171 To support
this argument, critics present the examples of innovations that are actually
hard to copy or reverse engineer, such as integrated circuits and hardware
protected by obfuscation techniques. In addition, some innovators recoup
profits by keeping them secret. Other inventors may distribute products in
a way that is expensive to replicate, as is the case in motion pictures on
film stock or encrypting data. Finally, in a constant circle of innovation,
there is a phenomenon where first movers are able to recoup costs, as
happens in news, fashion, and trade secrets.172
Although utilitarian arguments could be used to justify
propertization of information like trade secrets, they are weak
165
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justifications for the propertization of information on the whole. This
approach especially fails with online and digital information, where
incentives are not needed where information overload exists.173 This
approach ultimately fails, however, because internalizing positive
externalities to a great extent should be avoided.

D. Personhood Theories
Personhood theories for intellectual property represent a strong
alternative to the previous theories. They emphasize a personal, nonpecuniary version of intellectual property, concluding that intellectual
creation is an expression of one’s self.174 Discussing whether ideas and
creations can be considered things and property, the philosopher Hegel
notes they can be contracted, but they are something inward and mental.
Thus, Hegel implies it is hard to describe ideas in legal terms.175 Although
primarily mental, Hegel concludes that “by expressing them it may
embody them and in this way they are put in the category of ‘things.’”176
Hughes in particular finds this theory appealing, noting that “the Hegelian
personality theory applies more easily because intellectual products, even
the most technical, seem to result from the individual's mental
processes.”177
One of the most prominent personhood theories based on Hegelian
arguments has been put forth by Radin. This theory divides property into
fungible and personal categories and asserts that “the more closely
connected with personhood, the stronger the entitlement.”178 This provides
powerful grounds for strong intellectual property protection. The problem
here, however, relates to alienability of creative works. Whether an author
can restrict further communication of her work must be determined, as
does the issue over whether it remains within her “personhood.”179 Indeed,
authors may have a strong interest in the continuing control over their
173
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expression,180 but the expression itself may in fact “[c]ommodify what was
declared uncommodifiable.”181 This question of alienability must be
answered before the proper intellectual property protections are
determined, for Hegel says nothing about whether intellectual property
should be protected. Hegel simply claims that, if society adopts such a
regime based in personhood, it is coherent to formulate it in terms of true
property rather than some sui generis rights.182
Personhood theory is applicable to information to an extent.
However, because of their non-personal, commercial character, some
kinds of information (such as trade secrets and fresh news) cannot be
justified under this theory. In contrast, other information (such as personal
data that is intrinsically tied to an individual) can perhaps find better
support under this approach.
After evaluating these three theories of property and their
connection to email-information, none of them are sufficient. Thus, the
non-copyrightable content of emails, information, and personal data is not
and should not be considered property.

CONCLUSION
Based upon current copyright and property law, and upon the
western theories of property, the legal nature of email appears clear. Email
content is not the property of its users. It can, however, be protected by
copyright, the tort of misuse of confidential information, trade secret
doctrine, data protection, or publicity rights.
Thus, there is a conflict between the law and the market, in the
form of service providers in their respective treatment of email. Laws give
rights to users with respect to their email content only insofar as it falls
under the aforementioned protections. This falls short of full ownership
protection, exposing a potentially large and indeterminable proportion of
email content. In contrast, the market and other actors support a different
conclusion: that users own their own content just as they own tangible
property.183 Ideally, legal harmonization should first occur between U.S.
180
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and U.K. legal regimes to rectify the slight differences in approach to the
legal nature of email content. Harmonization should then occur between
the legal and market systems, for it would clarify the legal consensus and
enable more coherent market approaches to technology. More specific
suggestion in this regard, as well as the relationship between legal nature
of emails and their transmission upon death, will be explored in the
author’s future publications.
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